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FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW: THE
SUPREME COURT'S FAILURE TO APPLY
WILLIAMS CONSISTENTLY
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001)
I. INTRODUCTION

Johnson,1

In Penry v.
the Supreme Court reviewed for a second
time the case of petitioner John Paul Penry, a mentally retarded man
convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a Texas jury.' Acting
as a federal habeas review court, the Supreme Court reversed in part
the lower court's decision with regard to jury instructions that failed
to provide jurors an opportunity to consider mitigating evidence, and
affirmed in part, concluding that petitioner's Fifth Amendment rights
had not been violated when a psychiatric report with statements about
petitioner's future dangerousness was admitted into evidence. 3
Penry's case reached the Supreme Court after retrial by a state jury
pursuant to the Court's earlier ruling in Penry v. Lynaugh ("Penry
T').4 This second Texas jury found Penry guilty of murder and again

sentenced him to death.5 After exhausting his state and federal remedies, Penry's case arose on writ of certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which had affirmed the district
court's denial of Penry's application for the federal writ of habeas
corpus.6

In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court first addressed the
532 U.S. 782 (2001).
The Supreme Court first reviewed Penry's capital case 1989 when it held that jurors
must be allowed to "consider and give effect" to mitigating circumstances at the sentencing
phase of the trial. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) [hereinafter "Penry "].
3 532 U.S. at 796.
4 492 U.S. at 302.
5 Penry v. Johnson, 215 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 532
U.S. 782 (2001).
6 Id.
2
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procedural mechanism by which this case arrived in federal court and
clarified the standard of review by which Penry's habeas appeal
would be adjudged under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).7 Justice O'Connor then addressed the substantive
issues, stating that the Fifth Circuit properly applied clearly established federal law in determining that admission into testimony of
statements taken from a psychiatric report did not violate Penry's
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.8 Finally, the Court concluded that the Fifth Circuit improperly applied
federal law as determined by the Supreme Court-specifically the
rule of Penry I-in its assertion that a supplemental jury instruction
allowed jurors to "consider and give effect" to mitigating circumstances in the sentencing phase of a capital trial.9 The Court therefore
reversed with regard to the jury instructions and affirmed as to the
Fifth Amendment complaint. °
This Note argues that the Supreme Court reached the proper
conclusion with regard to the Fifth Amendment claim, but failed to
apply the same skill in reasoning with regard to the adequacy of jury
instructions. Justice O'Connor, guided by the strength of her convictions in the opinion she delivered eleven years earlier in Penry I,
overlooked her own clear language in Williams v. Taylor" as to how
the Supreme Court should properly review a state court's adjudication on the merits under the AEDPA. By neglecting the mandate of
Williams, the Court not only provides a mixed message to state legislatures hoping to find guidance in drafting capital sentencing guidelines, specifically with regard to jury instructions, but also provides
little direction to lower federal courts as to the proper standard of review under the AEDPA for applications for the federal writ of habeas
corpus.

7 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1994), amended by Antiterrorism and Death Penalty
Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §104(3), 110 Stat. 1214, 1219 (1996) [hereinafter as amended].
See also infra notes 13-61 and accompanying text.
8 Penry, 532 U.S. at 795.

9 Id. at 804.
'0 Id.
11 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O'Connor, J. concurring).
12 See infra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. THE FEDERAL WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE
ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT

Penry filed his petition for the federal writ of habeas corpus after
the enactment of the AEDPA. 3 Therefore, the federal habeas statute
as amended by the AEDPA governed Penry's case. 4 The AEDPA
establishes the authority with which a federal court may grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court. 5 Federal courts have long had the
power to grant writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners "in all cases
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation
of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States."' 6
However, there has been tremendous disagreement through the years

as to the scope and breadth of the 1867 statute, as reflected by the
numerous amendments and complex body of case law that has
emerged since its original passage. 7 One of the first cases interpreting the statute was Ex Parte McCardle,8 a case in which a Mississippi newspaper editor was imprisoned by Northern military authorities pursuant to the Military Reconstruction Act for publishing
unfavorable editorials. 9 While ultimately adjudicated on other

grounds,2 ° McCardle provided an extremely expansive reading of the

statute by stating that it "brings within the habeas corpus jurisdiction
of every court and of every judge every possible case of privation of
13 Penry, 532 U.S. at 792.
14

Id.
is Williams, 529 U.S. at 402. See also Hopkins v. Cockrell, No. 3:98-CV-2355-P, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14871, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2001) ("Resolution on the merits in the
habeas corpus context is a term of art that refers to the states court's disposition of the case
on substantive rather than procedural grounds.").
16 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § I, 14 Stat. 385 (1868) (codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55
(1994)).
17 See generally Steven M. Goldstein, Chipping Away at the Great Writ: Will Death Sentenced FederalHabeas Corpus PetitionersBe Able to Seek and Utilize Changes in the Law?,
18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357 (1990-1991).
18 73 U.S. (6 Wall) 318 (1868).
19 Id. at 322. The Military Reconstruction Acts provided Northern troops the power to
imprison offenders without benefit of a jury trial for inciting insurrection or promoting
breaches of the peace.
20 The case is frequently cited as upholding "judicial stripping" as the Supreme Court
held that Congress could invoke the Exceptions Clause in order to take the McCardle case
off the Supreme Court's docket.
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liberty contrary to the National Constitution, treaties or laws. It is
impossible to widen this jurisdiction."'" In 1963, the Court reinforced this reading of the statute in Fay v. Noia,"2 stating that "Congress in 1867 sought to provide a federal forum for state prisoners
having constitutional defenses by extending the habeas corpus powers of federal courts to their constitutional maximum."23 Supporters
of an expansive interpretation of federal habeas review contend that
such a remedy has proven necessary based on past experience, and is
especially important in capital cases.24 The same proponents have
also suggested that the "lifetime tenure" of federal judges in contrast
to the political pressures on popularly elected state court judges could
serve to "immunize" federal judges from outside influence in adjudging habeas cases.2 5 Finally, in the capital punishment context, proponents of expanding federal habeas review argue that this broad reading of federal habeas law, by increasing the number of decisions
(throughout the course of a capital case, for example) "diminishes the
possibility of unconstitutional executions. '"26
Such an expansive reading is not without criticism from commentators, and increasingly, from the Supreme Court.27 Generally,
those who would limit grants of federal writs of habeas corpus are
concerned with providing some kind of finality in criminal cases as
well as the appropriateness of second-guessing state courts.2 8 Nor is
the Supreme Court convinced that increased litigation provides "better" results for criminal defendants. Rather, the Court stated in
Brown v. Allen29 in 1953 that
[r]eversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done. There is no
doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible,

McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) at 325-26.
372 U.S. 391 (1963).
23 Id. at 426.
24 Goldstein, supra note 17, at 360.
25 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 525 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26 Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F. 2d 1280, 1295 n.8 (9th Cir. 1989).
27 See, e.g., Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) ("Since habeas corpus
21

22

is an extraordinary remedy whose operation is to a large extent uninhibited by traditional
rules of finality and federalism, its use has been limited to cases of special urgency, leaving
more conventional remedies for cases in which the restraints on liberty are neither severe nor
immediate.").
28 Goldstein, supra note 17, at 359-360.
29 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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30
but we are infallible only because we are final.

The issue of finality, especially in capital cases, has been the
subject of heated debate in recent years.31 Several decisions by the
Supreme Court reflect this trend toward limiting the scope of the writ.
In Barefoot v. Estelle,32 for example, the Court noted that the "role of
federal habeas proceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and limited., 33 The Court
continued, "Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state
trials., 34 In O'Neal v. McAninch,35 the Court cautioned:
We have ample cause to be wary of the writ. Our criminal law does not routinely
punish the innocent. Instead, our Constitution requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the overwhelming majority of the innocent will never
reach the habeas stage, since they will not have been found guilty at trial. Appeals
and possible state postconviction relief further reduce the possibility that an innocent
of finality that we apply in habeas proceedings is
is in custody. The presumption
36
therefore well founded.

Similarly, the Court acknowledged the significant costs of an expansive vision of federal habeas review. "[F]ederal habeas review ...
disturbs the State's significant interest in repose for concluded litigation, denies society the right to punish some admitted offenders, and
intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of
federal judicial authority."37
Despite pronouncements by the Supreme Court suggesting new
limits on the scope of the doctrine, Congress' role in determining
federal habeas law has not been entirely clear. As pointed out by Justice Brennan in 1989, "Congress has done nothing to shrink the set of
claims cognizable on habeas since it passed the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1867."" 8 Congress took up the challenge of clarifying federal habeas law in 1996." 9 In that year, Congress passed the AEDPA in an
30 Id. at 540 (Jackson, J., concurring).
31 Goldstein, supra note 17, at 361.
32 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
33 Id. at 887.
34 Id.
35 513 U.S. 432 (1995).

Id. at 447 (citation omitted).
37Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 210 (1989) (quoting Harris v. Reed,
489 U.S. 255,
282 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
38 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 332 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36

39 Larry W. Yackle, A Primeron the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381,

382 (1996).
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attempt to resolve the confusion with respect to the consequence that
federal courts must give to previous state court judgments.4 0 Until
then, federal courts had viewed state court judgments de novo which
"left the impression that the federal court was to act without any necessary or explicit reference to a prior state court judgment."'" Under
the AEDPA, however, a federal court, while acting independently,
must take the prior adjudication on the merits as a "starting point"
from which to begin federal habeas review.42 "Yet the focus of that
independent federal judgment is not the merits of the claim in the air,
but rather the accuracy of the prior state court decision on the merits." 43 By clarifying the standard of review, Congress, with the
AEDPA, significantly reined in the authority of federal courts to
evaluate cases on the merits, and thereby narrowed the scope of the
writ.
Williams v. Taylor44 provides the most recent definitive examination of federal habeas law as interpreted by the Supreme Court since
the passage of the AEDPA 5 In Williams, Justice O'Connor was
joined by a majority of the Court in her concurrence 46 that interpreted
the AEDPA; Justice Stevens delivered the opinion evaluating the
substance of the petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim. 47 The Court
reversed and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit, holding that the
petitioner had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorneys failed to present mitigating
evidence during the sentencing phase of his capital trial. 4' As to the
AEDPA, Justice O'Connor relied on the plain language of the statute
to establish that a federal court may apply the writ of habeas corpus
to a person "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court"
only if the defendant may show that the state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

40

Id.

41 Id.

at 383.
Id.
43 Id. at 412-13.
44 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
45 See id. at 399.
46 Id. at 399 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
47 Id. at 367.
48 Id. at 398-99.
42
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States."49 This leading case proposed to clarify the language of the
statute holding that a state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme
Court precedent if: (1) the "state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law" or (2)
the "state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable
from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives a result opposite to [the Supreme Court]." 5 Because the Virginia state court in
Williams had issued a ruling "contrary to" or involving an "unreasonable application of' Supreme Court precedent, namely Strickland v.
Circuit was reversed and Williams was
Washington,"' the Fourth
2
relief1
habeas
granted
The Court recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) placed new
constraints on the grant of federal habeas relief and examined the two
conditions set forth in the statute independently.53 First, the Court instructed that "a federal habeas court making the 'unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of
clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable. 5 4 The
Court also noted that Congress expressly chose the word "unreasonable" rather than a term such as "erroneous" or "incorrect."55 Justice
O'Connor's contribution to the opinion placed great emphasis on the
significance of the difference between "unreasonable" and "incorrect," and represents the portion of the opinion upon which lower
courts have chosen to rely on as one of the most important aspects of
the Williams holding.56 "[T]he most important point is that an unrea-

49

Id. at 402-03. The complete language of the statute quoted in the case reads:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1 )-(2)).

" Id. at 405.
51 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (defining the constitutional right to the effective assistance of
counsel).
52 Williams, 529 U.S. at 399.
53 Id. at 409.
54 Id. at 409.
55 Id. at 410.
56

Id. See, e.g., Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir. 2000).
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sonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law."57 From this, the Court concluded that "a
federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court
decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously58or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.
The Court also discussed the significance of the disjunctive test
provided by the statute.59 The Williams court asserted that the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses have "independent
meaning," thereby providing a foundation upon which lower courts
could rely in interpreting future habeas claims under the AEDPA.6 °
Williams remains the most definitive interpretation of the AEDPA
since its amendment in 1996, and the basis of almost all lower courts'
analyses of questions presented under the federal habeas statute. 6'
B. FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
AND THE USE OF PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY INCAPITAL CASES
Penry's first substantive claim involved his alleged denial of the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination in violation of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.62 Penry alleged
that a psychiatric report ("the Peebles report") that made reference to
his "future dangerousness" should have been inadmissible at trial because Penry had not been given proper warnings that statements he
made during the uncounseled exam could later be used against him in
capital sentencing. 63 The relevant language of the Fifth Amendment
states: "nor shall any person ... be compelled in any criminal case to

be a witness against himself. ' 64 The Founding Fathers included this
fundamental constitutional principle in the Bill of Rights in order to
protect the common-law privilege against self-incrimination, a privi57 Williams, 529
58

59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 411.
Id. at 407.

U.S. at 410.

Id. at 404. See also Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 558-59 (5th Cir. 2001).
See, e.g., Stephens v. Hall, 294 F.3d 210, 225 (1st Cir. 2002).
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 793 (2001).
Id. The psychiatric examination was conducted in 1977 by Dr. Felix Peebles and the

report is referred to in the opinion as "the Peebles report." The exam was conducted in order
to determine Penry's competence to stand trial for an offense totally unrelated and committed years before the capital offense in which the Peebles report became a Fifth Amendment
issue. Id. at 788.
64 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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lege recognized as far back as the thirteenth century.6" The Supreme
Court summed up the "essence" of the privilege saying that it "is the
requirement that the State which proposes to convict and punish an
individual produce the evidence against him by the independent labor
of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it from
his own lips."66 Subject only to limited exceptions,67 an individual
must explicitly invoke his Fifth Amendment right in order to receive
its protections.68 Unless an individual invokes the Fifth Amendment
upon questioning, he is deemed to have waived his right.69 Once invoked, a determination will be made as to the validity of that invocation, namely whether the individual is being subject to compelled testimonial incrimination.
"The three variables-compulsion,
testimony, and incrimination-thus form the core of the Fifth
Amendment."7"
1. Compulsion

With regard to the Peebles report, 71the question of compulsion
turned on the fact that it was Penry's own attorney who had requested
the psychiatric examination in 1977 in order to determine Penry's
competency to stand trial for an offense committed two years before
he committed the capital offense in which the Fifth Amendment issue
of compulsion was raised.72 "Compulsion normally means that person has been ordered to testify by a state actor who has the power to
sanction the refusal to testify. 7 3 The Supreme Court held in Le/kowitz v. Turley, 74 that the Fifth Amendment not only permits a defen65 Jonathan Kaden, Therapyfor Convicted Sex Offenders: Pursuing Rehabilitation
Without Incrimination,89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 347, 353.(1998).
66 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961).
67 The three exceptions are police interrogation, statutory reporting requirements for "in-

herently suspect classes," and in cases in which the exercise of one's Fifth Amendment
rights would be penalized. See RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 644 (2001).
68

Id.

69

See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (holding that Miranda

rights need not be specifically waived through express written or oral waiver, but that waiver
may be "inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.").
70 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 67, at 645.
71 Penry, 532 U.S. at 788. See supra note 62 (discusses background of the Peebles report).
72

Penry, 532 U.S. at 794.
supra note 67, at 645 (emphasis added).
414 U.S. 70 (1973).

73 ALLEN ET AL.,
74
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dant to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial, but also
"privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any
other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings."75 The
Court concluded that a witness who is compelled to answer, if protected by the privilege, would not have provided answers that would
be admissible against him in later criminal prosecutions. 6
By contrast, business papers that were voluntarily prepared, 7 or
tax returns and other such papers voluntarily prepared in fulfillment
of a regulatory requirement,78 do not enjoy protection under the Fifth
Amendment precisely because their preparation was voluntary and
therefore not compelled. Further, depositions in civil actions and
voluntary grand jury testimony are similarly not compelled and therefore not protected by the Fifth Amendment.79 Likewise, the Court
has not extended this notion of compulsion to include a voluntary
clemency interview in spite of the inherent pressure created by having only one guaranteed clemency review when under a sentence of
death.8" "[T]he respondent has the same choice of providing information to the Authority-at the risk of damaging his case for clemency
or for postconviction relief-or of remaining silent. But this pressure
to speak in the hope of improving his chance of being granted clemency does not make the interview compelled."'" Thus, if a statement
is in any way voluntarily made, or has been requested by a non-state
actor, it will not qualify under the Fifth Amendment as being "compelled." Because the questioning psychiatrist in Penry's case was not
a state actor, but rather a doctor called to duty by Penry's own lawyer, the question of compulsion is the key Fifth Amendment issue

5 Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
76

Id. at 78.

77 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984).
78

See United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927); see also United States v.

Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000).
79 Eric Steven O'Malley, Fifth Amendment at Trial, 89 GEo. L.J. 1598, 1601 (2001). In
addition, because these communications are not compelled, they may be subsequently used
against a defendant at a later criminal trial. However, if grand jury testimony has been "immunized," the state may not use that testimony against the defendant unless the government
may first establish an "independent source" of the same information. Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972) (upholding a statute requiring witnesses who invoke the
Fifth Amendment to testify upon the grant of "use-immunity").
80 See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1998).
81 1d.
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presented by the case.
2. Testimony
After determining whether communication has been compelled,
a court will next determine whether it is testimonial in order that it
should receive Fifth Amendment protection. The question of whether
a communication is testimonial was considered in Doe v. United
States,82 where the Court stated that "in order to be testimonial, an
accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a
factual assertion or disclose information."83 The Court explained that
the privilege might also extend to physical communication, and thus,
not be limited to verbal communication. The Court concluded that
the key to determining whether the privilege applied was whether or
not the content being sought by the government has "testimonial significance."84 However, the Court has also ruled on a wide variety of
physical communications that were not found to be testimonial for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment, including, blood samples,85 DNA
samples,86 handwriting exemplars,87 and voice exemplars.88 The Doe
court explained that such decisions were "grounded on the proposition that 'the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise providing the State with

82
83
84

487 U.S. 201 (1988).
Id. at 210.
Id. at 210 n.9. A long line of cases is devoted to defining what is "testimonial" for

purposes of the Fifth Amendment. For many years, the Court defined "testimonial" very
narrowly and the cases generally restricted the understanding of what would be considered
testimonial. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990) (finding evidence of
slurred speech was not testimonial); see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564
(1983) (finding evidence of refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test was not testimonial). On
the other hand, the line of cases dealing with the act of production doctrine indicates a distinction between physical and testimonial communication and has significantly broadened
what the Court defines as testimonial. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38
(2000) (holding that the act of producing documents may be testimonial); see also United
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-14 (1984). The Court has not given any clarity as to what
is will be considered "testimonial" since Hubbell. For a proposed unifying theory explaining
the complexity of Fifth Amendment doctrine, see Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The
Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment
Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430 (2000).
85 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
86 See Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (1Oth Cir. 1998).
87 See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
88 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I, 7 (1973).
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evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature."' 89 The Court affirmed that the previous examples of physical communications did
not violate the Fifth Amendment.9" Rather, it stated that it is the "'extortion of information from the accused,' the attempt to force him 'to
disclose the contents of his own mind,' that implicated the SelfIncrimination Clause."'" There is little question that statements given
to a questioning psychiatrist would have testimonial significance, especially where the mental capacity of the person being questioned
was a key issue at trial. Therefore, Penry's statements included in the
Peebles report would qualify as "testimonial" under the Fifth
Amendment.
3. Incrimination

Finally, in order to receive Fifth Amendment protection, the
compelled testimony must also be incriminating. The Court has thus
held that "[t]he interdiction of the Fifth Amendment operates only
where a witness is asked to incriminate himself-in other words, to
give testimony which may possibly expose him to a criminal charge.
But if the criminality has already been taken away, the Amendment
ceases to apply."" However, the Court was reluctant to apply such a
high threshold to potential incrimination. In United States v. Freed,93
the Court held that the National Firearms Acts registration requirement did not violate petitioners Fifth Amendment rights in spite of
the fact that information disclosed could potentially incriminate him
in the future.94 The Court therefore rejected the argument that furnishing photographs and fingerprints as per the regulatory scheme
would likely incriminate the petitioner since he
[i]s not confronted by 'substantial and real' but merely 'trifling or imaginary, hazards
of incrimination'-firsi by reason of the statutory barrier against use in a prosecution
for prior or concurrent offenses, and second by reason of the unavailability of the registration data, as a matter of administration, to local, state, and other federal agen-

89 Doe, 487 U.S. at 210 (quoting Schnierber, 384 U.S. at
761).
90 Id. at 211 (citations omitted).
91

Id.
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431 (1956) (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 67 (1906)). Ullmann marks the modern era of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence where
only the risk of conviction will implicate the notion of "incrimination" as opposed to the attendant consequences of conviction. See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
93 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
94 Id. at 606.
92
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The Court again addressed the question of future incrimination
in Hoffman v. United States,96 making clear that the quality of the
connection between the "testimony" and the potential "incrimination"
would be determinative.97 In that case, the Court extended the privilege to include not only communications that might in themselves be
incriminating, but also "those which would furnish a link in the chain
of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime."98
Providing guidance for trial judges in their determination as to
whether the privilege could be properly invoked, the Court directed
that in order "[t]o sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from
the implication of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that
a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure
could result."99
The issue of a threatening environment and potentially injurious
answers is never more poignant than in the context of psychiatric testimony in capital cases. In the leading case, Estelle v. Smith,'00 the
Supreme Court held that the prosecution's use of evidence from a
court-ordered psychiatric examination at the penalty phase of a capital murder trial constituted a violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.'
The prosecution used the testimony of an examining
psychiatrist to resolve whether "there [was] a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute
a continuing threat to society."'' 2 But the Court found that such testimony was inadmissible when it had been procured from a psychiatric report ordered by the trial judge, who was thus in effect acting as
an "agent of the State."'0 3 Because the defendant had made testimo95 [d. (quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53-54 (1968)).
96 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
97 Id. at 486-87.

9' Id.at 486.
99 Id. at 486-87.

100 451 U.S. 454 (1981).

'o' Id.at 463.
102 Id.at 458. See also infra note 182 and accompanying text.
103 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 466. The trial judge ordered the exam at the pre-trial phase of the
trial order to establish that defendant Smith was competent to stand trial. Although the
court's psychiatrist was examining only to determine competency, he later testified at the
penalty stage of the trial that Smith was an extreme sociopath who would likely kill again.
Id.
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nial statements divulging the contents of his mind, compelled by a
state actor in the form of the court-ordered examination, which could
be incriminating at the penalty phase of his trial, the communication
was deemed inadmissible." 4 The Court was clear, however, that the
holding would be limited to the "distinct circumstances" presented in
the case and no further."°5 "A criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric
evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his
statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding."'0 6 In an explanatory footnote, Chief Justice Burger noted: "Of
course, we do not hold that the same Fifth Amendment concerns are
necessarily presented by all types of interviews and examinations that
might be ordered or relied upon to inform a sentencing determination.' 0° In fact, the Estelle holding is so limited, that no other case
has been upheld under the same standard.0 8
However, psychiatric testimony at the penalty phase of a trial has
likewise been deemed inadmissible when no proper Miranda warnings were given prior to the court-ordered examination.0 9 Likewise,
when the examining psychiatrist does advise a defendant of his constitutional right to remain silent before an examination, and that right
is waived, then testimony as to a defendant's future dangerousness
has been found admissible in capital cases." 0 A more recent case
elaborated on the Supreme Court's proffered possible exceptions to
the Estelle ruling. In Buchanan v. Kentucky,"' the Court enunciated
a "rebuttal exception" whereby if a defendant presented psychiatric
evidence, the prosecution had leave to present "rebuttal" psychiatric

104Id. at 473.

"05 Id. at 466.
106 Id. at 468.
107 Id. at 469, n. 13. The other types of cases that were left open to consideration include
(I) when a defendant has put his mental status at issue in the case, (2) when a defendant decides to use psychiatric evidence on his own behalf, (3) when the exam is not ordered by a
court-appointed psychiatrist, or (4) when the nature of the conduct exhibited during the examination is not testimonial in nature. See generally Welsh S. White, The PsychiatricExamination and the Fifth Amendment Privilege in Capital Cases, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 943 (1983); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
108 Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001).
109 See Jones v. McCotter, 767 F.2d 101, 102-03 (5th Cir. 1985).
11o See Woomer v. Aiken, 856 F.2d 677, 681-82 (4th Cir. 1988).
111 483 U.S. 402 (1987).

20021

PENRY v. JOHNSON

evidence without violating the privilege against self-incrimination. 1 2
The Court thus held that introduction of evidence from a psychiatric
report did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights because:
(1) evidence was used for limited rebuttal purposes on crossexamination and (2) the defendant had asserted an insanity defense
thereby placing his mental status at issue." 3 Further, key to the holding in Buchanan was the fact that defendant's own counsel had ordered the examination." 4 Thus, while Penry's statements in the
Peebles report could have been viewed as incriminating, the key
question remained as to whether the report satisfied the first prong of
the three-prong Fifth Amendment analysis-whether the statements
were compelled or not.
C. JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND MITIGATING EVIDENCE

The second part of Penry's claim addressed by the Supreme
Court was the deficiency of the jury instructions offered at Penry's
retrial. Specifically, Penry alleged that the given instructions were
not constitutionally sufficient under Penry I because they "did not
provide the jury with a vehicle for expressing its reasoned moral response to the mitigating evidence of Penry's mental retardation and
childhood abuse.""' 5 The Supreme Court was asked more than two
decades earlier to rule on the constitutionality of the Texas capital
sentencing structure in Jurek v. Texas." 6 The Texas statute provides
that if a jury answers three statutorily-mandated questions in the affirmative at the sentencing phase of a capital trial, then a death sentence will be automatically imposed." 7 The Court in Jurek concluded that the statutory questions do allow jurors to consider
mitigating evidence and thus the Court upheld the Texas scheme as
constitutional within the bounds of the Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence." 8 "By authorizing the defense to bring before the jury at
the separate sentencing hearing whatever mitigating circumstances
relating to the individual defendant can be adduced, Texas has ensured that the sentencing jury will have adequate guidance to enable
112

Id. at 403.

113

Id. at 425.
Id. at 423.

114
115
116
117

118

Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796 (2001).
428 U.S. 262 (1976).
See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
428 U.S. at 276.
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it to perform its sentencing function." '19 The decision in Penry I declined to overrule Jurek, and indeed Penry did not challenge the "facial validity" of the Texas statute during his first Supreme Court
trial."'
Recently, the Texas legislature amended its capital sentencing
statute, as noted by Justice O'Connor in Penry, to include the express
consideration of mitigating circumstances. 21 The Court offered in
dictum tacit approval of the revised Texas capital sentencing scheme:
Texas now requires the jury to decide '[w]hether, taking into consideration all of the
evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character and
background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient
mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant
that a sentence of life imprison122
ment rather than a death sentence be imposed."

This approval sheds light on possible new constitutional boundaries
for jury instructions in capital cases and the role of mitigating circumstances.12 ' However, because Penry was tried and sentenced
prior to the revision, his sentencing took place under the previous
Texas statutory scheme, and jurors thus were faced with the same
24
statutory instructions that were upheld as constitutional in Jurek.1
The importance of adequate jury instructions has been a theme in
American jurisprudence since the 1735 trial of Peter Zenger.12 5 But
only since the United States began a reevaluation of the constitutionality of capital punishment has the consequence of jury instructions
been addressed with equal passion. For almost one hundred years
prior to the ruling in Furman v. Georgia,126 American juries had unfettered discretion in applying the death penalty, with little or no
guidance from state legislatures or judges as to when or how to apply
119

Id.

120 See Penry 1, 492 U.S. 302, 315,328 (1989).
121 Penry, 532 U.S. at 803.
122 Id. (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(2)(e)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2001)).

123 See infra note 345 and accompanying text.
124 Penry, 532 U.S. at 802.
125 See Gerard N. Magliocca, The Philospoher'sStone: Dualist Democracyand the Jury,

69 U. CoLO. L. REV. 175, 190-191 (1996). The trial of Peter Zenger involved a charge of
seditious libel in which Zenger's lawyer, Alexander Hamilton, instructed the jury that it
could vote to acquit if he had proven that Zenger's statements about Governor Cosby were
not false. Despite the fact that the law did not allow for truth as a defense, the jury voted to

acquit Zenger. In so instructing the jury, Hamilton invited the jury to nullify the law, representing the first notorious case ofjury nullification in the New World.
126 408 U.S.

238 (1972).
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the sentence of death.127 In Furman, the Supreme Court held that the
random application of the death penalty represented cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.'28 Thus, the
Court struck down as unconstitutional all death penalty statutes in effect at the time of the ruling that gave unlimited and unguided discretion to jurors in applying the death penalty. 29 Four years after its decision in Furman, the Court ruled that the death penalty was not
inherently cruel and unusual punishment and thus, could provide a
constitutionally appropriate sentence in particular circumstances. 130
Most states had answered Furman by implementing "guided discretion" sentencing statutes, later upheld in Gregg v. Georgia, which
allowed jurors to weigh aggrayating circumstances against mitigating
circumstances.'13 Mitigating evidence has been defined by the Supreme Court as "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the Defendant proffers as
a basis for a sentence less than death.'

132

In Johnson v. Texas,

33

Jus-

tice O'Connor in a dissent addressed the "constitutional requirement
that a sentencer be allowed to givefull consideration and full effect to
mitigating circumstances.' ' 134 In that case, she stated that "the sentencer in a capital case must be permitted to consider relevant mitigating factors in ways that can affect the sentencing decision.' ' 35 The
purpose of allowing a jury to consider mitigating circumstances relates to a long-time emphasis on culpability in sentencing in American jurisprudence.' 36 "[T]he sentence imposed at the penalty stage
should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background,
character, and crime rather than mere sympathy or emo37
tion."'
127

J. Dwight Carmichael, Penry v. Lynaugh: Texas Death Penalty Procedure Unconsti-

tutionally PrecludesJury Considerationof MitigatingEvidence, 42

BAYLOR

L. REv 347, 348

(1990).

128Furnan,408 U.S. at 257.

Carmichael, supra note 127, at 349.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
131 Carmichael, supra note 127, at 350-51.
132Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).
133509 U.S. 350 (1993).
134Id. at 381 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
135Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136 See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett, 438 U.S. 586.
137California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (holding
that an instruction informing jurors that they "must not be swayed by mere sentiment, con129

130
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The Supreme Court elaborated on what the Constitution requires
of state legislatures and/or trial courts in the composition of jury instructions in Penry P38 With regard to capital cases and mitigating
circumstances, the Supreme Court held that "when ...mitigating
evidence is presented ... juries must, upon request, be given jury instructions that make it possible for them to give effect to that mitigating evidence in determining whether the death penalty should be im'
posed."139
The Court reasoned that instructions that failed to inform
the jury that it could "consider and give effect" to a defendant's mitigating evidence by declining to impose the death penalty were a constitutionally inadequate "vehicle" for expressing the "reasoned moral
response" mandated by California v. Brown. 4 ° For it is only when
the jury is given an instruction that allows for the consideration of
mitigating circumstances that the Court may be assured that the instruction complies with the Eighth Amendment, namely that the jury
"has treated the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human bein~g]'
and has made a reliable determination that death is the appropriate
sentence."''
However, what a jury does with instructions, once given, is in
large part beyond a court's control. Jury nullification occurs when a
jury elects not to follow the law as it has been presented to them by a
judge in the form of instructions. 42 The issue of jury nullification in
criminal cases is especially volatile, and nowhere is that more apparent than in a capital case. The Supreme Court has come down

jecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling" during the penalty
phase of a capital murder trial does not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution).
138 Penry 1,492 U.S. 302, 318-19 (1989).
139 Id.at 319.
140 Id. at 328. See infra note
137.
141Id. at 319 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (alteration in original).
142 Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 877,
881
(1999). Jury nullification could occur in a civil or a criminal case. However, in a civil case,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a mechanism for ajudge to grant a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, thereby reversing a jury that, perhaps, has not followed the law
correctly in the judge's estimation. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 50 ('Judgment as a Matter of
Law in Action Tried by Jury'). The issue ofjury nullification received national attention in a
series of cases during the Vietnam War era in which defendant war protestors charged with
crimes in relation to acts of "civil disobedience" were denied nullification instructions. See,
e.g.,
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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squarely against jury nullification in capital cases and has characterized jury nullification as the "assumption of a power" which a jury
has "no right to exercise" in Dunn v. United States. 43 More recently
in United States v. Powell,' the Supreme Court spoke of "impermissible" reasons for returning a verdict of not guilty, and affirmed the
principle established in Dunn that a defendant could not attack a
criminal conviction on one count simply because it was inconsistent
with a jury's verdict of acquittal on another count.145 The D.C. Circuit, in even more serious language, has stated that jury nullifications
"are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power."'' 46 In more recent jurisprudence, the Second
Circuit has led the circuits in admonishing jury nullification in all circumstances.147 "Public and private safety alike would be in peril if
the principle be established that juries in criminal cases may, of right,
disregard the law as expounded to them by the court, and become the
law unto themselves."' 48 Indeed, the circuits remain unanimous in
of instructions informing jurors as to their power to nultheir14denial
9
lify.
Finally, in evaluating a set of jury instructions-in order to determine whether a jury has been given a nullification instruction, for
example, or whether instructions accurately reflect the law of the jurisdiction-courts have made several assumptions. First, courts will
assume that jurors generally follow instructions, even if the instructions are limiting. 5 ' "The rule that juries are presumed to follow
143284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932) (quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir.
1925)).
144469 U.S. 57 (1984).
145 Id. at 63.

146United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
147United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614-18 (2d. Cir. 1997) ("categorically reject[ing]" jury nullification).
148United States v. Lynch, 181 F.3d 330, 338 (2d. Cir. 1999) (quoting Sparf v. United
States, 156 U.S. 51, 101 (1895)).
149Marder, supra note 142, at 903 n.127.
150Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-08 (1987). Richardson discusses Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), as a narrow exception to the general rule that juries are
capable of following complex instructions. "There are some contexts in which the risk that
the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so
vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitation of the jury system cannot be
ignored." Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36 (quoted in Richardson, 481 U.S. at 207). The Bruton
court held that a defendant faced just such a situation where an extrajudicial confession of a
nontestifying codefendant was presented to a jury despite the fact that the jury has been in-
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their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a
reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and
the defendant in the criminal justice process."'' Second, courts have
held that jurors will take a "commonsense" approach to jury instructions, looking to the totality of the circumstance in which the instruction has been given.'52 In a case decided before Penry I, the Court
addressed the capacity of a jury to make sense of a seemingly ambiguous instruction in California v. Brown.'

In Brown, jurors had

been given an instruction in a capital case that informed them not to
be swayed by "mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling."' 54 The Court found the instruction to be reasonable under the Constitution's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, saying that "[t]he doctrine of noscitur a sociis is
based on common sense, and a rational juror could hardly hear this
instruction without concluding that it was meant to confine the jury's
deliberations to considerations arising from the evidence presented,
both aggravating and mitigating.""' The Court did not accept the
argument that a juror would take the phrase "mere sentiment" out of
context and thereby disregard important mitigating evidence. "Even
a juror who insisted on focusing on this one phrase in the instruction
would likely interpret the phrase as an admonition to ignore emotional responses that are not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating
evidence introduced during the penalty phase."' 56 Likewise, in Boyde
v. California, the Court affirmed a defendant's conviction, finding it
unlikely that jurors misunderstood their instruction to consider all
mitigating evidence." 7 Therefore the conviction was not in violation
of Penry L.. The Court in that case acknowledged that jurors were
perhaps less likely to become mired in the complex language of jury

structed to consider the information exclusively against the codefendant. Id.
15 Id. at 211.
152 See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 381 (1990).
479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987).
154Id. at 552 (quoting People v. Bandhauer, 463 P.2d 408, 416 (Cal. 1970)).
15 Id. at 543. Black's Law Dictionary defines noscitur a sociis as the "canon of con153

struction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the
words immediately surrounding it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1084 (7th ed. 1999).
156

Id.

'57Boyde, 494 U.S. at 381-83.

158Id.
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instructions than persons with formal legal training: "[j]urors do not
sit in solitary isolation booths parsing instructions for subtle shards of
meaning in the same way that lawyers might."1"9 The Court continued, "[d]ifferences among [jurors] in interpretation of instructions
may be thrashed out in the deliberative process, with commonsense
understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken
place at the trial likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting." 6 '
While courts presume that juries follow instructions with regard
to guilt or innocence, it is not as clear that juries do not exercise considerable discretion with regard to sentencing, especially in capital
cases.161 This potential for unchecked discretion on the part of juries
was central to the Supreme Court's decision to overrule a state capital
sentencing scheme in Louisiana." 2 The Court in Roberts v. Louisiana found that the "responsive verdict procedure not only lacks standards to guide the jury in selecting among first-degree murderers, but
it plainly invites the jurors to disregard their oaths and choose a verdict for a lesser offense whenever they feel the death penalty is inap'
The Court was disturbed by the "element of capripropriate."163
ciousness" injected into a situation in which a juror's power to decide
whether a defendant would face the death penalty or not was "dependent on their willingness to accept this invitation to disregard the
trial judge's instructions." '6 4 The Court concluded that arbitrary sentencing and effective jury nullification was not constitutional. 65 The
key to the Roberts opinion was that it was intolerable for jurors, on
no evidence at all, to be able to move an offense downward, for example, from first- to second-degree murder.166
In sum, both courts and legislatures have struggled with how
best to instruct juries in the consideration of mitigating evidence in
capital cases. Courts have generally disapproved of jury nullification
while legislatures have continued to refine capital sentencing structures to avoid nullification instructions and at the same time to allow
jurors to consider a wide array of both mitigating and aggravating
159

Id. at 3 80-8 1.

160

Id. at 381.

161

See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976).
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).

162

163
164
165

166

Id. at 334-35
Id. at 335.
Id.
Id.at 334.
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evidence.'67 Finally, courts have generally given jurors credit for the
capacity to make sense of even the most complex instructions. However, this faith in their abilities is always checked against the constitutionality of an instruction.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Johnny Paul Penry raped and murdered Pamela Carpenter on October 25, 1979 in Livingston, Texas.'68 Penry returned to Carpenter's
home after having met her several weeks earlier when he helped deliver appliances in her home.'6 9 Penry raped Carpenter in her bedroom and then stabbed her with a pair of scissors that she had used
earlier to try to defend herself.171 Police quickly found and identified
Penry as meeting the description Carpenter had given shortly before
she died under emergency care.' 7 ' After being read his Miranda
warnings, Penry gave statements confessing to the rape and murder
of Pamela Carpenter and was subsequently indicted for capital murder.'
Although police read Penry his rights, it is not clear
73 that he
understood them. Johnny Paul Penry is mentally retarded.
At trial, Penry offered extensive evidence regarding his mental
retardation as well as evidence that he had been severely abused as a
child.' 74 Penry also raised an insanity defense at the guilt/innocence
phase of the trial.7 5 Despite extensive testimony and agreement
among examining psychiatrists that Penry had "mental limitations,"
the jury rejected Penry's insanity defense and sentenced him to
"'
death. 76
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convic167

See infra notes 342-48 and accompanying text.

168 Penry 1, 492 U.S. 302, 307 (1989).
169 Brief for Respondent at 2, Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (No. 00-6677).
170Id.

at 3.

17" Penry 1, 492 U.S. at 307.
172

Respondents' Brief at 4-5, Penry (No. 00-6677).

173 At a competency hearing before Penry's trial, Dr. Jerome Brown, testified that
Penry

was "mentally retarded" with an IQ of 54, and "with learning or knowledge of the average 6
and one-half year old kid." Penry 1, 492 U.S. at 307-08.
174 Dr. Jose Garcia testified at trial that Penry suffered from organic brain damage which
caused moderate retardation. This condition caused Penry to suffer "poor impulse control
and an inability to learn from experience." Further testimony revealed that Penry's mother
had often beaten him over the head with a belt and denied him access to toilet facilities for
long periods of time while he remained locked in his room. Penry 1,492 U.S. at 308-09.
175 Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 917 (5th Cir. 1987).
176 Pcnry was convicted in the 258th Judicial District Court, Trinity County, Texas.
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tion and the sentence, thereby rejecting Penry's argument that a sentence of death violated the Eighth Amendment because the jury had
been unable to give effect to petitioner's mitigating evidence and that
it was cruel and unusual punishment to execute a mentally retarded
person."' The Supreme Court declined to hear Penry's case on direct
review.' 78 Penry next appealed in federal district court for the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus and was subsequently denied
by both the district court and the court of appeals.' 79 The United
States Supreme Court granted relief by vacating his sentence in order
to review the case under federal habeas jurisdiction. 8 ' In that decision, the Court held that the Texas statutory system did not allow jurors to give effect to and consider mitigating evidence regarding
Penry's alleged mental retardation and child abuse, and remanded the
case to a Texas trial court to be retried in a manner consistent with its
opinion.' 8 '
At retrial, the trial judge adhered to Texas law in presenting to
jurors the three statutorily-mandated questions at the sentencing
phase of the trial,' 82 but supplemented the statutory instructions in or177 Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Cr. App. 1985). See infra notes 344-48 and

accompanying text.
178 Penry v. Texas, 516 U.S. 977 (1995) (petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas was denied).
179 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied the writ, and
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) defendant's confession and waiver of Miranda rights were voluntary; (2) defense counsel expressly withdrew his objection on the issue of exclusion of one venireman and the juror
could not therefore be rehabilitated; and (3) although Texas capital sentencing structure arguably did not provide adequate opportunity for a jury to consider mitigating circumstances
in a capital case, the statute had been expressly upheld as constitutional by the United States
Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), and the court was thus bound by existing law. Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1987).
180 Penry 1, 492 U.S. at 302.
181Id.
182 The three questions are presented at the sentencing phase of all Texas capital trials.
This statutory scheme was found to be constitutional in Jurek, 428 U.S. 262. The three questions are:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would
result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
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der to comply with the rule of Penry I with the following directive:
You are instructed that when you deliberate on the questions posed in the special issues, you are to consider mitigating circumstances, -if any, supported by the evidence .... A mitigating circumstance may include, but is not limited to, any aspect
of the defendant's character and record or circumstances of the crime which you believe could make a death sentence inappropriate in this case. If you find ... any mitigating circumstances ... you must decide how much weight they deserve, if any, and
therefore, give effect and consideration to them in assessing the defendant's personal
culpability at the time you answer the special issue. If you determine, when giving effect to the mitigating evidence, if any, that a life sentence, as reflected by a negative
finding to the issue under consideration, rather than a death sentence, is an appropriate
response to the personal culpabilit
of the defendant, a negative finding should be
18
given to one of the special issues.s

Jurors were also given information as to how to consider the information in the supplemental instruction during voir dire and at closing arguments by both the prosecution and defense.'84 However, jurors were sent to deliberate with only the three statutory questions
and no written copy of the supplemental instruction. 18' The jury
again answered "yes" to each of the three statutory questions and
therefore, as mandated by law, delivered a sentence of death.' 86 On
direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals the court found
that the supplemental instruction complied with the directive of
Penry I and affirmed Penry's sentence.187 After being denied a federal writ of habeas corpus, Penry sought a certificate of appealability
from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.' 88 The Fifth Circuit denied his application and
held that "the challenged instruction was constitutional [and] was not
an 1unreasonable application of clearly established law, namely Penry
i.qi 89

On November 27, 2000, the United States Supreme Court
granted Penry's petition for certiorari and stayed his execution.' 90

Penry, 532 U.S. 782, 805 n.1 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(b) (Vemon 1981 and Supp. 1989)).
183Respondents' Brief at 15-16, Penry (No. 00-6677).
184 Penry, 532 U.S. at 801-02.
181Id. at 799.
186 Id. at 790.
187 Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995).
188 Penry v. Johnson, 215 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 2000).
189Id.at 509.
190Penry v. Johnson, 215 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 531 U.S. 1010 (U.S.
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The Court granted the petition to decide whether the court of appeals
had properly considered petitioner's application for the federal writ
of habeas corpus, namely whether the jury instructions offered complied with Penry I and whether admission of a psychiatric report
based on an uncounseled interview with Penry violated the Fifth
Amendment.191
IW. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS

A. MAJORITY OPINION

In an opinion by Justice O'Connor,'9 2 the Supreme Court reversed in part the Fifth Circuit's decision because jury instructions
did not reasonably comply with federal law established under Penry
I, and affirmed in part by rejecting petitioner's self-incrimination argument that admittance of psychiatric testimony violated his Fifth
Amendment rights.'93 Justice O'Connor began by giving a full explanation of the events which led to the case's arrival in the Supreme
Court, specifically the facts and procedural history of Penry J.194 She
next stated that the Court granted certiorari and stayed Penry's execution in order to address petitioner's constitutional arguments including the adequacy of jury instructions in complying with the mandate
of Penry I, as well as petitioner's Fifth Amendment arguments with
regard to the admission of the Peebles report.' 95
The Court then looked at the procedural issue of the filing of the
federal writ of habeas corpus as a threshold concern before reaching

Nov. 27, 2000) (No. 00-6677).
191 Penry, 532 U.S. at 786. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed
all of
the issues Penry raised in his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, staying Penry's execution, solely to examine the constitutional issues presented by the "admission of the Peebles report and the adequacy of the jury instructions." Id.
at 792. The Supreme Court declined to consider whether admission of several other psychiatric reports violated the Fifth Amendment, nor did it consider alleged Sixth and Eighth
Amendment violations.
192 Justice O'Connor's decision was unanimous as to Parts 1,11 and III-A of
the opinion.
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice O'Conner in Part
III-B of the opinion, while Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
193 Penry, 532 U.S. 782.
194 Id. at 786-92.
195 Id. at 792-96; see infra note 200 and accompanying text.
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the substance of Penry's claims. The Court explained how federal
habeas law was applied to cases, such as Penry's, filed after the passage of the AEDPA, relying on the recent decision in Williams v.
Taylor in which a state court's interpretation of a governing legal rule
was "objectively unreasonable."' 96 The Court devoted a full section
of the opinion to explaining the application of the AEDPA in Williams and affirmed that a lower court's decision was not necessarily
objectively unreasonable if a state court applied established federal
law "incorrectly."' 97 The Court concluded Part II of the opinion by
approving the standard of review employed by the Fifth Circuit-the
same standard articulated in Williams-as a framework within which
to review the substance of Penry's arguments.'98
Still joined by a unanimous court, Justice O'Connor proceeded
to the substance of Penry's argument, adhering to the standard articulated in Williams. The Court first addressed the Fifth Amendment
portion of the case, concluding that it was not "objectively unreasonable" for the lower court to deny Penry relief as to his Fifth Amendment claim.'99 Penry argued that admission of the Peebles report, the
1977 psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Felix Peebles referring to Penry's
"future dangerousness," constituted compelled self-incrimination and
thus, violated his Fifth Amendment privilege."' 0 Penry claimed his
case was analogous to Estelle v. Smith, where the Court found that
statements from a defendant's uncounseled competency exam that
were later used against him in testimony relating to the defendant's
future dangerousness in a capital sentencing hearing violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights."0 ' The Court distinguished
Penry's case from Estelle, relying on several key factors. "First, the
defendant in Estelle had not placed his mental condition" at issue,
whereas Penry had made his mental retardation the subject of review
at all levels of his trial.202 The Court also noted that, in this case,
Penry's own counsel had called for the competency hearing whereas
196 Id. at 793; see also supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text, discussing Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
197 Penry, 532 U.S. at 792-93.
198 Id. at 793.
199 Id. at 795.
200 Id. at 793.
201 Id. at 793-94; see also supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text, discussing Estelle
v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
202 Penry, 532 U.S. at 793-94.
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in Estelle, the trial court had ordered the examination and the State
had chosen the examining psychiatrist, making the doctor an effective
"agent of the State."2" 3 Most noteworthy in the Court's estimation
was the fact that, in Estelle, the defendant was charged with the capital crime at the time of the psychological examination; whereas, in
Penry's case, the testimony was derived from a report taken from a
previous offense that occurred years before Penry committed a capital crime.2"4
While the Court seemed to agree with the Fifth Circuit's conclusions that Estelle was distinguishable on the facts, the Court again
noted the standard of review and declined to rule on the merits:. 5
"We need not and do not decide whether these differences affect the
merits of Penry's Fifth Amendment claim. Rather, the question is
whether the Texas court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of our precedent."20 6 The Court thus affirmed the
Fifth Circuit with regard to Penry's Fifth Amendment claim and
found that the lower court's conclusion that Penry's privilege against
self-incrimination had not been violated was not "objectively unreasonable."2 °7 The Court concluded Part Ili-A of the opinion by noting
that even if the admission of the Peebles report violated Penry's Fifth
Amendment rights according to Supreme Court precedent, such an
error would not justify overturning Penry's sentence unless Penry
could show that the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.""2 8 Because the Court concluded that Penry could not make such a showing in light of at least
four other officials testifying to Penry's future dangerousness and a
multitude of other evidence on the same point, the Court reiterated its
affirmance of the lower court. 9
Next, in Part Ill-B of the opinion, Justice O'Connor addressed
the issue of jury instructions under the same standard of review ar-

203
204

205
206
207
208
209

Id. (quoting Estelle, 451 U.S. at 467).
Id.
Id. at 794-95.
Id.
Id. at 795.
Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).
Id. at 795-96. "While the Peebles report was an effective rhetorical tool, it was by no

means the key to the State's case on the question whether Penry was likely to commit future
acts of violence." Id. (emphasis added).
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ticulated in Part II. 20 However, the Court reached the opposite conclusion here, finding that the lower court's application of Penry I had
been "objectively unreasonable."2 ' The Court first criticized the
Texas court for failing to recognize that "mere mention" of mitigating
circumstances did not fully comply with Penry I since the jury
needed to be able to not only "consider" the mitigating circumstances, but also to be able to "give effect" to them when imposing a
sentence.212 Justice O'Connor then addressed each of the State's arguments in turn as to how the supplemental instruction provided the
jury the requisite vehicle for giving effect to Penry's mitigating evidence.2"3
First, the Court rejected the possibility that jurors might have
taken mitigating evidence into account in their consideration of each
of the special issues while at the same time giving truthful answers in
accordance with their oath. 214 The Court noted that this situation
would not have differed materially from the situation in Penry I in
which it was found that "none of the special issues is broad enough to
provide a vehicle for the jury to give mitigating effect to the evidence
of Penry's mental retardation and child abuse. 21' The Court then rejected the State's argument that the jury could give effect to mitigating evidence by "simply answer[ing] one of the special issues 'no' if
it believed that mitigating circumstances made a life sentence ... ap21 6
propriate . . . regardless of its initial answers to the questions.
Addressing precedent on the issue of how jurors follow instructions,
the Court concluded that such an instruction was tantamount to jury
nullification. 217 The Court further noted that the reasonable possibility of capricious behavior on the part of the jury could not have provided an adequate "vehicle for the jury to make a reasoned moral response to Penry's mitigating evidence."2 8
The Court found the State's reply insufficient, stating that the
context of the supplemental instruction would not save it on a reason210

Id. at 804.

211

Id.

212

Id.at 797.
Id.at 797-804.
Id. at 797-98.
Id.at 798.
Id. (quoting Respondent's Brief at 16, Penry (No. 00-6677)).
Id.at 799-800.
Id.at 800.

213
214

215
216
217
218
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ableness evaluation.219 In reply to the State's contention that both the
prosecution and defense had adequately explained the supplemental
instruction during voir dire as well as during closing arguments, the
Court found that both did little to give jurors the opportunity to "give
effect" to Penry's mitigating evidence-voir dire being too long ago
to be of import and explanations at closing argument being "neutralized" by statements instructing the jury to follow its oath.22 0 The
Court observed that the current Texas statutory scheme, amended after Penry's second trial and sentencing, would comply with the mandate of Penry J 221 Justice O'Connor thereby suggested that in contrast, the scheme used at Penry's second trial, despite the addition of
the supplemental instruction, did not give jurors an adequate opportunity to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence, a conclusion
markedly similar to that reached in Penry T222
In a final paragraph, the Court moved from the substance of
Penry's claim to the procedure, stating that "to the extent the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the substance of the jury
instructions given at Penry's second sentencing hearing satisfied our
mandate in Penry I, that determination was objectively unreasonable. '2' Because the supplemental instruction was "ineffective and
illogical," leaving jurors with the same three special issues to consider at sentencing, the Court concluded that the approach was unreasonable, and therefore reversed the Fifth Circuit decision.224
B. DISSENT

Justice Thomas and two other justices 225 joined the majority in
the Court's decision to affirm the Fifth Circuit's decision as to the alleged Fifth Amendment violation and concurred with the Court in
Parts I, II, and 111-A of the opinion. 6 However, the three justices,
including Justice Thomas writing the dissent, did not agree that the
mandate of Penry I was still unfulfilled after the second sentencing,
at 799-800.
Id. at 800-02.
221 Id. at 804.
222 Id.
22 Id. at 803-04.
224 Id. at 804.
225 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined in Justice Thomas'
opinion, concurring in part, dissenting in part. Id.
226 Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
219 Id.
220
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and therefore dissented from Part III-B of the opinion: "Two Texas
juries have now deliberated and reasoned that Penry's brutal rape and
murder of Pamela Carpenter warrants the death penalty under Texas
law.""2 7 Justice Thomas reasoned that jurors in the second trial of
Penry were given reasonable opportunity to consider the mitigating
evidence that Penry presented and therefore that the constitutional requirements of Penry I, namely that jurors be given the opportunity to
consider and give effect to mitigating evidence in a capital case, were
satisfied.228 The dissent rejected the majority's position as a threshold issue, citing Williams v. Taylor as evidence for the contention that
"[w]e must decide merely whether the conclusion of the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals-that the sentencing court's supplemental instruction explaining how the jury could give effect to any mitigating
value it found in Penry's evidence satisfied the requirements of
[Penry /]-was 'objectively unreasonable."' 229 Because the dissent
found that jurors might have given reasonable effect to the mitigating
evidence as charged by the supplemental instructions in Penry's second trial, the dissent could not join the majority in finding that the
Texas judge's discretion met the high standard for reversal as articulated in Williams.230
The dissent also relied on a "common sense" understanding of
jury instructions, citing two previous Supreme Court decisions that
instructed against the "technical parsing of this language" but rather
called for a more "common sense understanding of the instructions in
the light of all that has taken place at the trial., 23' The dissent concluded that a "straightforward" reading of the instructions would
have given any reasonable juror an adequate vehicle for expressing
the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death based on
consideration of mitigating evidence.2 2 The dissent went beyond defending the Texas supplemental instructions as "straightforward" but
also called them "eminently logical. 233
Justice Thomas laid out three reasons in support of his position.
227
228
229
230
231

Id. at 804 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 806 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 805 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
Penry, 532 U.S. at 805 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 806 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368

(1993)).
232 Id. at 807 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
233 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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First, the dissent argued that the judge gave clear instructions to the
jury indicating that mitigating evidence could be considered in the
sentencing phase of the trial.234 Next, the dissent pointed out how the
sentencing court "explained to the jury how it must give effect to the
evidence., 235 The dissent concluded its analysis by stating that the
court "unambiguously" instructed the jury to vote "no" instead of
"yes" if they felt that death was not an appropriate sentence. Justice
Thomas stated, "[w]ithout performing legal acrobatics, I cannot make
the instruction confusing. And I certainly cannot do the contortions
necessary to find
the Texas appellate court's decision 'objectively un23 6
reasonable.'
The dissent next addressed the issue of jury nullification raised
by Roberts v. Louisiana, and called any suggestion of jury nullification or reliance on Roberts "misplaced., 237 The dissent distinguished
Roberts on the facts, pointing out that Roberts had involved a case
where jurors were instructed to find the defendant guilty of a lesser
offense, even if unsupported by evidence, if they felt that death was
not an appropriate sentence.23 The dissent differentiated Penry's
case where there was no suggestion, "express or implied," that the
jury could "disregard" the evidence.239 The dissent, rather, saw the
instructions given at Penry's second trial as completely fulfilling the
Penry I mandate, instructing jurors not to disregard evidence, but
rather to "give effect" to mitigating evidence.24 °
The dissent concluded by noting that the Court was sending
"mixed signals" with its majority opinion. 24 ' The dissent reasoned
that this Court had previously upheld the Texas sentencing statute as
constitutional in Jurek v. Texas, as already permitting jurors to consider mitigating evidence, and yet had refused to overrule Jurek in
Penry .242 Given that, the dissent reasoned, it was not clear how the
latest answer to Court's directive did not meet its constitutional crite234 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).

235 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
236

Id. at 808 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

237 Id. at 809 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325,
334-35 (1976)).
238 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
239 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
240 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
241 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
242Id. at 810 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 116-24 and accompanying
text (discussing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)).
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ria: "[T]his Court yet again has second-guessed itself and decided
that even this supplemental instruction is not constitutionally suffi'
cient."243
V. ANALYSIS

This Note argues that the Supreme Court correctly applied the
standard of review as mandated by the AEDPA and as articulated in
Williams in its analysis of Penry's alleged Fifth Amendment violations, but failed to apply the same standard when evaluating the reasonableness of the jury instructions at Penry's second trial. Rather,
the Court overlooked what it had written just one year earlier in Williams v. Taylor when it examined the issue of jury instructions, and
incorrectly applied the AEDPA to conclude that Penry's second sentencing did not comply with the directive of Penry I and was there'
fore "objectively unreasonable."244
The Court took care to dedicate
an entire portion of the opinion to articulating the standard of review.245 In so doing, it affirmed the Fifth Circuit's enunciation of the
standard of review in its denial of relief to Penry, and thereby rejected the District Court's approach to its review of the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals.246 The Court made perfectly clear that Williams
would dictate its approach to the substance of Penry's claims and a
unanimous court supported the articulation of this standard. 247 Yet it
was fulfilled in only one half of the opinion and all but disregarded in
the second half.24
A. WHILE APPLYING WILLIAMS CORRECTLY ON THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT ISSUE, THE COURT'S ANALYSIS FAILED TO CLARIFY
AMBIGUITIES AFTER WILLIAMS

Justice O'Connor's opinion, joined by a unanimous court for
Parts I, II and 111-A of the opinion, correctly articulated the standard
of review and applied it with sufficient dexterity in reaching the conclusion that the lower court's rejection of Penry's Fifth Amendment
claims was not "objectively unreasonable" or "contrary to" Supreme
243
244

(2000).
245
246
247
248

Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 808 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409
Penry, 532 U.S. at 792-93.

Id.
Id.
Id.

PENRY v. JOHNSON

20021

Court precedent, namely Estelle v. Smith.24 9 However, while reaching the proper conclusion under the proper standard of review, the
Court left some ambiguity as to how lower courts should approach
habeas review under the AEDPA. 2 0 There was little discussion of
Williams v. Taylor as applied to Penry. For example, the Court never
fully explained why its decision rested on the "objectively unreasonable" standard as opposed to the "contrary to" standard.25 1 Further,
the Court declined the opportunity to clarify the Brecht rule of
"harmless error" after the passage of the AEDPA, leaving lower
courts to guess at the vitality of that rule.2 52
The Court began its look at the Fifth Amendment issues by providing a step-by-step analysis of the differences between the Estelle
facts and the facts presented by Penry's case. 253 The Court correctly
noted that the differences were "substantial., 254 However, only after
a discussion of the facts and distinguishing precedent-substantive
concerns-did Justice O'Connor reach the central question presented
by Penry's claim-the procedural merits, namely whether his claim
was justified under a federal habeas standard of review. 255 Thus, it
was more than halfway through the Fifth Amendment portion of the
opinion, that the Court finally addressed the primary question, which
was "whether the Texas court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of [Supreme Court] precedent. 2 56 The Court
concluded very briefly: "We think it was not." '57 Justice O'Connor
brought the discussion to a close by stating that it was not "objectively unreasonable for the Texas court to conclude that Penry is not
entitled to relief on his Fifth Amendment claim., 258 While the Court
did provide an example of the concise nature of a habeas review by
declining to rule on the merits of the case, the Court's conclusion that
the lower court's application of the legal principle discussed in
Estelle was satisfactory as per the AEDPA, did not rest on a compre249
250
251
252

Id. at 795; see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
See, e.g., Downs v. Moore, 801 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 2001).
Penry, 532 U.S. at 794-98.
Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); see supra notes 208-09 and accom-

panying text; see also Anderson v. Cowan, 227 F.3d 893, 898 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000).
253 Penry, 532 U.S. at 794.
254 Id. at 795.
255 Id.; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000).
256 Penry, 532 U.S. at 795.
257
258

Id.
Id.
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hensive discussion of how Williams was being applied to the relevant
precedent.259
Further, while the Court did do an adequate job of discussing and
distinguishing Estelle, there was little discussion of Buchanan v. Kentucky, 260 which is also relevant precedent and received considerable
attention in the briefs. 26' The Court did not address the rebuttal issue
presented by Buchanan, likely because it was not applicable to the
legal question presented by Penry.162 However, by not evaluating all
relevant precedent, it is difficult to make the sweeping statement that
the lower court's decision was not "objectively unreasonable" in light
of "clearly established federal law. ' 63 In fact, Buchanan received no
more than parenthetical treatment by the Court.2 64 Because Buchanan
represents the more recent look at the Fifth Amendment by the Supreme Court, it is important that the Court at least attempt to distinguish the case with comparable analysis to the treatment of Estelle. It
is not sufficient to merely note that "we have never extended
Estelle's Fifth Amendment holding beyond its particular facts. 2 6' By
discussing only two previous cases, and one only parenthetically, the
Court did not squarely establish that the lower court had not reached
a conclusion contrary to all relevant precedent, nor did it indicate
how extensively future courts need inquire into precedent in order to
meet the "clearly established
federal law" requirement under 28
2 66
U.S.C. § 2245(d)().
In addition, the Court never explained why it chose the "unreasonable application" inquiry rather than the "contrary to" inquiry,
leaving lower courts to formulate their own ideas as to the application
of Williams.167 The Williams court stated that "a run-of-the-mill
state court decision applying the correct legal rule from our cases to
the facts of a prisoner's case would not fit comfortably within §
259
260
261
262

Id.
483 U.S. 402 (1987).
Brief for Petitioner at 7-10, Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (No. 00-6677).
Id.; see supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing Buchanan, 483 U.S.

at 403, which enunciates a "rebuttal exception" whereby if a defendant presented psychiatric
evidence, the prosecution has leave to present rebuttal psychiatric evidence without violating
the privilege against self-incrimination).
263 Penry, 532 U.S. at 793.
264 Id. at 795.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 793.
267 See, e.g., Anderson v. Cowan, 227 F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 2000).
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'
2254(d)(1)'s 'contrary to' clause."268
The fact that the Court did
point out the substantial differences between the extant case and the
facts presented in Estelle ignores what the Court previously highlighted under Williams: "[T]he most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect ap'
plication of federal law."269
Therefore, the Court was not strictly
applying Supreme Court precedent, but rather distinguishing precedent. A more illustrative approach might have shown why the distinguishing features made the decision on the merits of Penry's claim
fall within the "unreasonable application of" inquiry rather than the
"contrary to" inquiry as mandated by the AEDPA, and as shown to
be independent inquiries under Williams.27 °
Lower courts looked to the fact that the Williams court focused
its attention on the "unreasonable application" clause and generally
took guidance from Williams in applying the AEDPA rather than following Penry.2 7 ' A recent First Circuit decision noted that the "inreasonable application of' prong of § 2254(d)(1) essentially "reduces
to a question of whether the state court's derivation of a case-specific
rule from the [Supreme] Court's generally relevant jurisprudence ap'
pears objectively reasonable."272
Other courts have emphasized the
standard of review, calling it a "high threshold" and "highly deferential" standard of review, citing to Williams rather than taking guidance from the more recent Penry as a roadmap in applying the
AEDPA. 73
Finally, the Court failed to clarify whether the "harmless error"
rule of Brecht v. Abrahamson or the AEDPA controls.
Under Brecht, a constitutional trial error is not so harmful as to entitle a defendant to
habeas relief unless there is more than a mere reasonable possibility that it contributed

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000).
Id, at 409.
270 Id.
271 See, e.g., Anderson, 227 F.3d at 896-97 (stating that "[w]hen the case fits under the
,unreasonable application' clause of § 2254(d)(1), however, we defer to a reasonable state
court decision").
272 Williams v. Matesanz, 230 F.3d 421, 425 (1st Cir.
2000) (quoting O'Brien v. Dubois,
142 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 1998)).
273 See, e.g., Miller v. Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 615 (6th Cir. 2001). See also Frye v. Lee,
268
269

235 F.3d 897, 903-04 (4th Cir. 2000) ("Our conclusion that Frye's claims are premised on
clearly established federal law, however, merely allows us to continue our inquiry .... We
are cognizant of, and we are bound to apply, the Williams reasonableness standard as we
analyze and consider the claims made in this proceeding.").
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to the verdict. It must have had a substantial effect or influence in determining the
verdict. Moreover, the Brecht standard does not require in order for the error to be
held harmful that there be274a reasonable probability that absent the error the result
would have been different.

The Seventh Circuit conducted a survey of the other circuits' approach to the question of Brecht after the passage of the AEDPA in
Anderson v. Cowan.275 In that case, the court questioned the applicability of Brecht since the passage of the AEDPA. 26 The Eighth Circuit has also noted the limited vitality of the Brecht rule in the wake
of the AEDPA, suggesting that the standard in Brecht is more generous than that of the AEDPA and therefore in potential conflict with
congressional intent. 7
However, the Supreme Court in Penry missed the opportunity to
provide clarification on this issue. The Court instead discussed both
standards in equal detail and appears to have ultimately relied on
Brecht in making its final ruling as to the Fifth Amendment issue.78
"Even if our precedent were to establish squarely that the prosecution's use of the Peebles report violated Penry's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, that error would justify overturning Penry's sentence only ifPenry could establish that the error" was
harmful. 279 Again, the Court addressed the question of error on the
merits, explaining that the Peebles report "was neither the first nor
the last opinion the jury heard" on the issue of Penry's future dangerousness.80 The Court further addressed the critical showings of
Penry's future dangerousness in turn, concluding that "[w]hile the
Peebles report was an effective rhetorical tool, it was by no means the
key to the State's case on the question whether Penry was likely to
commit future acts of violence., 281 The Court thus appeared to rely
on Brecht for its ultimate conclusion, stating, "[a]ccordingly, we will
not disturb the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' rejection of Penry's
Fifth Amendment claim."2 2 However, the Court failed to clarify
274 Tucker v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 617, 620 (5th ir. 2001); see Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S.
782, 795-96 (2001) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).

275 Anderson, 227 F.3d at 898 n.3.
276 Id.
277 See Witmore v. Kemna, 213 F.3d 431, 433 (8th Cir. 2000).
278 Penry, 532 U.S. at 796.

279 Id. at 795 (emphasis added).
280 Id.

211 Id. at 796.
282 Id. (emphasis added).
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whether its decision could have been framed exclusively under Williams. The Court did, however, reach the proper conclusion in finding that the lower court had not erred in rejecting Penry's claim that
admission of the Peebles report had violated his Fifth Amendment
rights under the Constitution.
B. CONCLUDING THAT THE SUPPLEMENTAL JURY INSTRUCTION

COMPLIED WITH PENR Y I REPRESENTS A REASONABLE
APPLICATION OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

This Note next argues that in the interest of seeing Penry I complied with as a substantive constitutional question, Justice O'Connor
lost sight of the standard of review-a test of objective reasonableness-and improperly decided the case on the merits. Because the
Texas trial judge's decision to supplement the statutory scheme was
not objectively unreasonable, the Court reached the improper conclusion in reversing the Fifth Circuit on the question of the reasonableness of jury instructions.
While the Court acknowledged the Williams standard in the first
section of its opinion, there is no reference to the standard of review,
Williams or the AEDPA, in Part B of the opinion.283 This glaring deficiency opened the door for the Court to advance freely into the merits of the claim, rather than keeping its focus narrow, as is required in
federal habeas review. The Supreme Court previously stated that
"[h]abeas is an extraordinary remedy" and therefore should be used
judiciously.284 The purpose of federal habeas review is not to provide
an alternative avenue for the relitigation of the issues, but rather to
decide whether the court below made a decision contrary to or unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent."' Even if a decision is
patently wrong, the Court acknowledged in Part II of the opinion that
it would not necessarily be unreasonable.286 However, Justice
O'Connor appeared reluctant to follow this rigorous standard when
applying it to a case she had tried on the merits years earlier.287
The Court demonstrated that its interest was not in procedural or
reasonableness review, but rather in seeing that the mandate of Penry

...Id. at 796-804.
284 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983).
285 Williams, 529 U.S. at 398.
286 Penry, 532 U.S. at 792.
287 Penry 1, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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I was substantively complied with at Penry's second trial. "Our opinion in Penry I provided sufficient guidance as to how the trial court
might have drafted the jury charge for Penry's second sentencing
hearing to comply with our mandate.""2 8 Reference to Penry I, while
correctly an examination of "clearly established federal law," appeared to lament the fact that the Texas court did not fulfill the mandate of Penry I as the Court might have hoped. The Court highlighted the fact that the factual situation presented in Penry was
virtually indistinguishable from that of Penry "289 "Viewed in this
light, however, the supplemental instruction placed the jury in no better position than was the jury in Penry E"",290 This would consequently suggest an outcome in Penry's second trial that was contrary
to Supreme Court precedent.
But the Court did not embrace the approach outlined in Williams,
and instead embarked on an "unreasonable application of' inquiry
without explanation of its choice between the two clauses. 91 In so
doing, the Court failed to give proper credit to the substance of the
supplemental instruction. The Williams court was abundantly clear
that a habeas reviewing court is not required to give "deference" to a
state court decision: "Section 2254(d) requires us to give state courts'
opinion a respectful reading, and to listen carefully to their conclusions, but when the state court addresses a legal question, it is the law
'as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States' that prevails. 2 9 2 However, Justice O'Connor does not appear to give even a
"respectful reading" to the supplemental instruction. The Court did
note that merely adding an instruction would not comply with the
mandate of Penry T293 However, the Court failed to give objective
consideration to the reasonableness of the content of the supplemental instruction. Instead, O'Connor dismissed the new instruction as
confusing and therefore inadequate with little or no evaluation of
relevant Supreme Court precedent regarding the content of complex

288

532 U.S. 802-03.

289

Id.
Id. at 798.

290
291

For this reason lower courts have had to look to Williams for guidance as to how to

apply the AEDPA instead of finding an application technique in Penry. See, e.g., Hurtado v.
Tucker, 245 F.3d 7, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2001).
292 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 387 (2000).
293 Penry, 532 U.S. at 797.
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294
jury instructions, as is mandated by the AEDPA.
The Supreme Court has held that jurors, while generally presumed to follow given instructions,29 will evaluate those instructions
in light of all the information that they have received at trial.296 Justice O'Connor did not succeed in giving a clear, "common sense"
reading to the supplement as the dissent suggested was required in
this case. Instead, the majority in Penry implied that because the
supplemental instruction was not what the Court would have written,
it was therefore unreasonable.297 As suggested in Boyde v. California, the Court should have approached the evaluation of the jury instructions as would have reasonable jurors, rather than as Supreme
Court justices with years of legal training."' Also, as the dissent
pointed out, the Court never made clear the leap from inadequacy to
objective unreasonableness.299 "Because Congress specifically used
the word "unreasonable," and not "a term like 'erroneous' or 'incorrect,' a federal habeas court may not grant relief simply because it
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court
decision applied federal law erroneously or incorrectly. "Rather, that
application must also be unreasonable.""3 °
The majority, however, not only overlooked the commonsense
approach to the supplement, but also dismissed the explanation of the
supplemental instruction at voir dire, both collectively and individually to potential jurors, as well as at closing arguments by both the
prosecution and the defense."' The majority thus found itself engaged in the same "technical parsing of the language" which Boyde

294
295
296
297

Id. at 797-99.
See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 381 (1990).
Penry, 532 U.S. at 803 ("A clearly drafted catchall instruction on mitigating evidence

also might have complied with Penry . Texas's current capital sentencing scheme (revised
after Penry's second trial and sentencing) provides a helpful frame of reference.").
298 494 U.S. at 381.
299 Penry, 532 U.S. at 805 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
300 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000).
301Respondents' Brief at 21, Penry (No. 00-6677).
If, when you thought about mental retardation and the child abuse, you think that this guy deserves a life sentence, and not a death sentence, ... then, you['ve] got to answer one of... those
questions no. The Judge has not told you which questions, and you have to give that answer,
even if you decide the literally correct answer is yes.

Id.
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specifically found that jurors do not themselves do. 32 As the Court
in Boyde said, "[e]ven were the language of the instruction less clear
than we think, the context of the proceedings would have led reasonable jurors to believe that evidence of petitioner's background and
character could be considered in mitigation.""3 3 But the majority in
Penry disagreed. Instead, the majority was skeptical of a juror's ability to remember instructions from voir dire, having taken place "a full
two months" before the jurors began deliberations over Penry's sentence.3"4 The Court
made much of the fact that jurors received
"mixed signals."3 5 O'Connor highlighted the fact, as she did in
Penry I, that defense counsel's attempt to clarify the jury's responsibility to give effect to mitigating evidence would be "neutralized" by
the prosecution's closing instructions that reminded jurors of their
duty to "to follow [their] oath, the evidence and the law."30 6

The dissent, on the other hand, gave careful examination to Supreme Court precedent, and thus, properly fulfilled the role of a habeas reviewing court. Rather than assuming that jurors cannot remember information given at voir dire as did the majority, the dissent
looked to Supreme Court precedent which suggests that jurors do
have significant ability to remember and follow instructions. 7 Because the AEDPA calls for an examination of "clearly established
federal law" and because the Supreme Court has ruled squarely on
the issue of a jury's ability to comprehend jury instructions, the majority overlooked important precedent in reaching its conclusion.30 8
The key concern in Penry I was that jurors were never instructed
that they could "consider and give effect" to mitigating evidence.30 9
It is not objectively unreasonable to find that the supplemental instruction at issue in Penry, which stated in relevant part that "[i]f you
determine, when giving effect to the mitigating evidence, if any, that a
life sentence ... rather than a death sentence, is ... appropriate ... a

302
303
304

See Boyde, 494 U.S. at 381.
Id. at 383 (emphasis added).
Penry, 532 U.S, at 802.

305

Id.

306

Id.
See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000).
Id. ("Had the jury desired further information, they might, and probably would, have

307
308

signified their desire to the court. The utmost willingness was manifested to gratify them,
and it may fairly be presumed that they had nothing further to ask.").
309 Penryl, 492 U.S. 302, 320 (1989).
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negative finding should be given to one of the special issues," satisfied this concern.3 1 It is, however, reasonable that the Texas trial
judge, when interpreting Penry I, chose to employ a supplemental instruction as opposed to changing the legislative scheme by adding a
fourth question without legislative authority."' Thus, the choice to
follow the Supreme Court precedent does not represent an unreasonable solution to the problem posed by Penry's retrial in light of the
suggestion in Penry L
In fact, Penry I suggested the use of an instruction rather than
mandating an additional question.312 Indeed, the Texas statutory
scheme, upheld as constitutional in Jurek, provided for three questions, and there was no conclusion mandating that a fourth question
would be required.313 The majority in Penry referred to specific substantive examples, suggested in Penry I as well as by Penry's counsel
at oral argument, of how jurors might have been able to consider
mitigating evidence.3 14 But if a court should choose not to follow another court's suggestion in dicta or one adversary's suggestion at oral
argument, it does not necessarily make that court's chosen course objectively unreasonable." 5 The dissent properly pointed out that "[a]s
a habeas reviewing court, we are not called upon to propose what we
believe to be the ideal instruction ....
Our job is much simpler, and
it is significantly removed from writing the instruction in the first instance. We must decide merely whether the conclusion of the [lower
court] ... was 'objectively unreasonable."' 316 What the majority neglected to address is that under Williams-even if the lower court's
determination that the supplemental instruction allowed jurors to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence was incorrect-it was not
unreasonable to think that such an instruction could very well provide

310
311

Penry, 532 U.S. at 797-98 (emphasis added).
Penry v. Johnson, No. 00-6677, 2001 U.S. Trans LEXIS 31, at *25 (Mar. 27, 2001)

(transcript).
312 Penry 1, 492 U.S. at 328 ("In this case, in the absence of instructions informing the
jury that it could consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry's mental retardation and abused background by declining to impose the death penalty, we conclude that
the jury was not provided with a vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral response' to that
evidence in rendering its sentencing decision.") (emphasis added).
313 Penry, 2001 U.S. Trans LEXIS 31, at *26.
314 Penry, 532 U.S. at 801-02.
315 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000).
316 Penry, 532 U.S. at 805 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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such a vehicle as mandated by Penry L 317
The dissent, on the other hand, more clearly outlined why the
supplemental instruction is not objectively unreasonable. First, the
Court's precedent speaks to the manner in which jurors evaluate jury
instructions."' The Court noted in Johnson v. Texas that jurors will
not approach an instruction as a lawyer might-engaging in the
"technical parsing of the language"-but rather will "approach the
instructions ...with a 'commonsense understanding of the instruc-

tions in light of all that has taken place at the trial."' 319 The dissent
correctly highlighted that reading the supplemental instruction in
such a "straightforward" manner as the Court has held that juries will,
yields a clear opportunity to meet the mandate of Penry L320 Second,

Justice Thomas noted that "common sense" compels the dissent to
classify the Texas court's action at Penry's second trial as objectively
reasonable.32' Because a juror was given an instruction that if he or
she did not think the death penalty an appropriate sentence in light of
Penry's mitigating circumstances, then he or she should simply return
an answer of "no" to at least one of the three special issues, the dissent reasoned that jurors had ample opportunity to "give effect" to
any mitigating evidence they might find. 22 When read with such a
common sense approach, the instruction seems far from "confusing"
or "illogical" as the majority tried to persuade.323 While the dissent
might be extending itself somewhat in calling the instruction "eminently logical," Justice Thomas is at least persuasive in demonstrating that the instruction is an objectively reasonable response to the
mandate of Penry L324

Finally, the dissent properly pointed out that there is nothing arbitrary or capricious about how jurors were instructed in Penry as
evidenced by the careful instructions during voir dire, opening and
closing arguments, as well as the supplemental instruction.2 Both
317See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
318

Id. at 805-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200

(1987); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
319 Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993).
320 Penry, 532 U.S. at 806 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
321 Id.

322 Id.
323
324
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Id. at 807 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 807-08 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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prosecution and defense were well aware of the mandate of Penry I,
and demonstrated a good faith effort to comply with it.3"6 Further,
there is no evidence to support the conclusion that jurors were given a
nullification instruction.12 ' A nullification instruction would invite a

juror to breach his or her oath to answer each of the three questions
truthfully in accordance with the law.328 In the case of Penry's retrial,
however, the supplemental instruction was not a nullification instruction. A juror could have upheld his or her oath since the supplemental instruction, which guided jurors to answer "no" if they did not
wish to impose the death penalty, was part of the overall instruction-three questions plus a supplement-that the jurors received.329
As the Supreme Court has pointed out in other cases, jurors will not
view an instruction as discrete parts, but rather will approach a complex instruction as a whole, giving it a common sense reading.33 °
There was no invitation to give false answers or to disregard Penry's
culpability.33
Rather, the jury was invited to consider just how
33 2
Penry's culpability should be reflected in his sentence.
The Court had been disturbed in Roberts by the "element of capriciousness" that accompanied being able to "disregard the trial
'
judge's instructions."333
However, the Roberts opinion involved a
situation where jurors could adjust a defendant's sentence downward
"on no evidence at all. 334 In Penry, on the other hand, the jury was
asked to "consider and give effect" to the evidence in order to give a
"reasoned moral response" and in light of his mitigating circum'
stances."335
Thus, jury nullification was not an issue in Penry despite
'
language by lower courts calling it a "nullification instruction."336
326
d.at808 n.4 (Thomas,J.,
dissenting).
327 Id. at 807-08 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
328Marder, supra note 142, at 881.
329 Penry, 532 U.S. at 807-08 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 381 (1990).
U.S. at 809.
332 Id. at 809-10; see Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 335 (1976).
333Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335.
334 Id.
335 Penry 1, 492 U.S. 302, 304 (1989); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604
(1978) ("[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.").
336 Penry v. Johnson, 215 F.3d 504, 509 (5th Cir. 2000).
330

331 Penry, 532
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Rather, the appellate court properly noted that, "[tihe jury was not
told to disregard the law; rather, it was instructed on how to obey the
'
law."337
Therefore, because the jurors had not acted capriciously, nor
had they been given an invitation to nullify the law, the majority mischaracterized the instruction as jury nullification in a final attempt to
explain why the supplemental instruction was unreasonable. However, Justice O'Connor and the Penry majority overlooked the Williams roadmap in evaluating the supplemental jury instruction and
decided the issue based on the merits of the case and thereby neglected the mandate of a federal habeas review court.
VI. CONCLUSION

Having declined to accept the Fifth Circuit's implicit invitation
to overrule Jurek in Penry I, the Penry court was left little room in
which to rule, further narrowed by the procedural posture of the case.
The Supreme Court held that John Paul Penry's Fifth Amendment
privilege had not been abridged when evidence from a psychiatric report regarding Penry's future dangerousness was deemed admissible. 38 Having clearly and correctly articulated the standard of review
under the AEDPA and Williams, the Court affirmed the lower court's
finding that admission of the report was not objectively unreasonable
nor was it contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme
Court precedent, notably Estelle.339 While the Court might have provided a more accurate roadmap for lower courts in following this
standard of review with regard to future habeas petitions and especially as to the application of the Brecht rule after the passage of the
AEDPA, the Court did reach the proper conclusion using proper reasoning.
As to the second issue faced by the Court in Penry, Justice
O'Connor, joined by five other justices, found that jury instructions
given at Penry's second trial did not comply with Penry I and were
therefore objectively unreasonable.34° By not bearing in mind more
carefully the standard of review, the Court needlessly addressed the
substance of the issue, without ever reaching the heart of the issuereasonableness. It cannot escape notice that Justice O'Connor wrote

337 Id.
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Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796 (2001).
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Id. at 795-96.
Id. at 804.
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the opinion in Penry I in 1989 and again in Penry in 2001. Justice
O'Connor's interest in adjudicating the constitutionality of Penry's
second trial on the merits overshadowed her task as a federal habeas
review court. Thus, as the dissent expressed, the Supreme Court sent
an even more "mixed signal" to lower courts than the jury received in
Livingston, Texas.341
VII. EPILOGUE

Since the writing of this Note, there has been significant activity
at the state level with regard to the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied to the mentally retarded. Most specifically, as mentioned in the analysis section of this Note, the Texas state legislature
has revised its capital sentencing guidelines requiring juries to make
an unambiguous determination that death is the appropriate sentence
in a particular case.342 Further, many states have banned executions
of the mentally retarded altogether.343 Finally, in Atkins v. Virginia,
decided in June of 2002, the Supreme Court acknowledged the "dramatic shift in the state legislative landscape" against the execution of
the mentally retarded since the decision in Penry "344The court overruled Penry I to hold that it is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to execute a person who is mentally
retarded.345 While the Atkins ruling does not change the analysis of
the habeas issue addressed in this Note, it does shed ligtt on the
change in American thought on the subject of the death penalty and
mental illness, and the influence that this change in thought has had
on the legislative landscape, as alluded to by Justice Stevens in the
Atkins opinion. Quoting the dissenters from the Virginia Supreme
Court opinion, Justice Stevens writes that "[the mentally retarded]
341

Id. at 809 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).

342 See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
343Eighteen states have enacted statutes outlawing the execution of the mentally
re-

tarded. Those states include Georgia, Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska, South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina. Additionally, Texas unanimously
adopted a similar bill in 2001, which was subsequently vetoed by Texas Governor Perry on
June 17, 2001. Virginia and Nevada both have passed similar bills in one house of the state
legislatures and the Illinois state legislature is currently reviewing the work of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment which has recommended that Illinois prohibit the
execution of the mentally retarded. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2248-49 (2002).
344 Id. at 2246.
345 1d. at 2252.
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have substantial limitations not shared by the general population. A
moral and civilized society diminishes itself if its system of justice
does not afford recognition
and consideration of those limitations in a
346
way.
meaningful
The opinion, however, "leave[s] to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon
its execution of sentences" and therefore provides no process for ensuring that the mentally retarded are not executed. 47 The Texas state
district judge presiding in Penry's new trial decided not to delay his
re-sentencing in light of the pending Supreme Court's decision in Atkins and instead merely instructed jurors that they had to find that
Penry was not retarded in order to impose the death penalty. 48
Though the high court has called it unconstitutional to execute the
mentally retarded, Penry's fate ultimately may be in the hands of the
Texas state legislature when they convene in January of 2003 to decide how Texas will define who is and who is not mentally retarded,
and thus implicitly, who is and who is not to remain on death row.
Mary Connell Grubb

346 Id. at 2246 (quoting Atkins v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 534 S.E.2d 312, 325 (Va.
2000)).
347Id. at 2250 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
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